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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
P. JAMES COLE¥AN, 
Appellant, 
VS. 
R. EARL DILLl1AN, 
AtJpellee. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
Case Nos. 16666 & 16926 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal from the decision of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein the nistrict Court 
denied the appellant Coleman specific performance of an oral 
contract for the purchase of land and granted the Appellee 
restitution of the premises. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 28 or 29 of 1975, the appellant moved into 
a home owned by the appellee located at 2670 Creek Road, Salt 
Lake County, Utah. The appellant testified that he moved into 
the house pursuant to an oral agreement for the purchase of the 
home for the sum of $36,000. He testified that the appellee 
had previously sold the home and the sale had fallen through 
and that appellant was merely to take over the position of the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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previous buyer and to keep the payments current of $303.29 
per month (Tr. 6-7). The appellee testified that the appellar 
was occupying the home pursuant to an oral rental agreement 
(Tr. 110), wherein the rent to be paid was $303.29 per month. 
After moving into the home the appellant made several im-
provements on the home, such as installing four windows; plant 
ing a lawn; replacing a yard which had been eroded by a flash 
flood (R. 87). Additionally, the appellant made improvements 
on the home such as repairs on the heater, placed a new motor 
on the furnace, and also had to have the sewer cleaned out 
eight or nine times (Tr. 88-89). At no time did the appellant 
ever request reimbursement from the appellee for the improve-
ments or the repairs (Tr. 88, 89). 
After moving into the home the appellant made several pay· 
ments to the appellee, although the same were sporatic and not 
the precise amount of the agreed consideration. 
The appellant and appellee engaged in several joint ventur 
wherein the appellant was working for the appellee (Tr. 86, 11 
121). Some of the compensation that the appellant would recei 
for such work, according to his testimony, went to apply on tr 
payment for the home. Additionally, and it is undisputed, thi 
the appellant made several payments to the appellee, some of 
which contained the words "house payment" thereon (Tr. 79-80, 
Ex. P. 1-2). 
Although there is a dispute as to whether the appellant wi 
occupying the premises pursuant to a purchase or rental contri 
the following facts are undisputed: 
-2-
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lrrunediately prior to the appellants occupying the premises 
the appellee had the premises listed for sale (Tr. 180-181). 
Appellant made payments upon the premises and some of those 
payments reflected the words "house payment" (Tr. 79-80, Ex. P. 
1-2). 
A commitment for title insurance was obtained (Tr. 96-97, 
Ex. P. 13). 
The appellant applied for a loan to pay the full purchase 
price to the appellant (Tr. 93, 97, 164-169). 
The appellant offered to pay off the appellee as soon as 
the judgments and liens were cleared up so that he could obtain 
the loan. 
The appellant instituted a lawsuit for specific performance 
to require the appellee to convey the property to himself (R. 
2-3). 
The appellee then instituted an action for wrongful detainer 
seeking eviction of the appellant (R. 1-2, 4 Sup. Ct. 4f16666). 
Appellee then moved to consolidate (R. 9-10). Thereafter, 
the parties stipulated that two actions "involved connnon ques-
tions of law and fact and should be consolidated for the purpose 
of trial" (R. 12, Sup. Ct. #16666) and the District Court ordered 
the actions consolidated for the trial (R. 13, Sup. Ct. #16666). 
Appellant requested a jury trial and the jury fee was paid 
(Tr. 11). The appellee objected to the jury demand (Tr. 44). 
At the time of trial without motion on the part of either 
party, the court separated the two cases and proceeded to try 
only the case for specific performance without a jury and left 
-3-
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the other case and issues to be tried at a later date with a 
jury. 
The court found, without a jury "the facts do not warrant 
finding that there was part performance and which would take t 
alleged oral contract out of the effect of the statute of frat 
(Tr. 59-60). The court further found that the attempt to obta 
financing and to pay off the balance of the purchase price, as 
suming an oral contract for sale was no justification for the 
appellant's failure to make the monthly payments thereafter (T 
60). 
POINT I 
THE TENDER OF THE FULL PURCHASE PRICE TO THE APPELLEE 
RELIEVES THE APPELLANT FROM MAKING THE FURTHER MONTHLY 
PAYMENTS. 
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts, there was a <lisp 
as to whether the appellant was occupying the premises in ques 
pursuant to an oral purchase agreement or an oral rental contr 
That question was never answered by the court. It should be 
noted that the District Court found there was not sufficient p 
performance to take an oral contract out of the statute of fra 
and, further, that the failure to make the monthly payments ev 
after a tender of the full purchase price did not relieve the 
appellant from a breach, there was never a finding as to wheth 
or not there was a contract in existence. This is, presumably 
because the District Court knew that such a question would pro 
perly be left for a jury and, therefore, did not decide the qu 
tion for fear of denying the appellant his right to a. jury tri 
This point will be more thorettghly discussed in later portion 
-4-
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this brief. However, if there was such a contract, it is the 
appellant's position that the attempt to obtain a loan to pay 
off the full purchase price and the frustration thereof by the 
appellee would excuse his remaining performance for the monthly 
payments. 
As noted previously, the appellant testified that he was 
occupying the premises pursuant to an oral purchase contract for 
$36,000 with monthly payments of $303.29. It is further undis-
puted that many of the payments were made, although some were 
not, and the sum of the payments contained the words "house 
payment" thereon. It is further undisputed that improvements 
were made on the house and that repairs were made and that no 
reimbursement was requested from the appellee. Then, and it is 
further undisputed, that the appellant attempted to obtain a 
loan to pay off the balance of the purchase price. It is further 
undisputed that the loan could not be obtained because the ap-
pellee had so many liens and judgments against the property that 
the lending institution would not make the loan. The appellant 
testified: 
"I tol<l Mr. Dillman I was going to go ahead and get 
the loan and pay the house off. So I proceeded to 
First Security State Bank. 
Question: During that conversation with Mr. Dillman, 
did he give you anything to help you in getting the 
loan? 
Answer: At that time, he did not give me anything. 
But he had given me Cormnonwealth Title Report prior 
to that, so that I could go at my convenience and 
get the loan. (Tr. 24-25) 
Question: Mr. Coleman, after obtaining Exhibit P-
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Question: I believe that your testimony was that 
you applied with First Security State Bank. 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: ~vith whom did you apply =or First Secu-
rity State Bank, any particular officer? 
Answer: With a loan officer, Gloria Oldham. (Tr. 
20-26) 
Question: Then after, did you have further deal-
ings with First Security State Bank. 
Answer: Only that I called up and said that the 
title was clouded and we would have to wait. Mr. 
Dillman was going to clear title the property for 
me. 
Gloria Oldham from First Security State Bank testified: 
Question: In connection with your employment (First 
Security State Bank) there, have you had occassion 
to meet Mr. Jim Coleman? 
Answer: Yes, I have. 
Question: What occassion did you have to meet him? 
Answer: He applied for a loan. 
Question: What type of loan was it? 
Answer: The conventional home loan. 
Question: Was the property mentioned? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: What was the property? 
Answer: 2670 Creek Road. (Tr. 93-94) 
After the loan had been declined because the title was 
clouded, appellant made no further monthly payments to the ap· 
pellee. The District Court found that such constituted a brea 
of the agreement between the parties and that the appellant wa 
not excused from the monthly payments merely because he was ~ 
-6-
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able to obtain a loan because the title of the property was 
clouded. 
There is no question that in a purchase of real estate, 
the seller has the obligation to deliver clear title. If his 
failure so to do prevents the purchaser from obtaining the ne-
cessary loan to pay off the balance due and owing on the pur-
chase price, it is the appellant's contention that such breach 
excuses the purchaser from further performance. Such a propo-
sition is Hornbook law. As stated in Am. Jur. on contracts 
(17 Am. Jur. 2d 899 Sec. 442): 
"It is a necessary implication that every contract 
with promises or covenants binding each party that 
neither will interfere to prevent performance by 
the other, and a contracting party whose performance 
of his promises is prevented by the adverse party 
is not obligated to perform .... If the non-exis-
tence, either of something which is a substantial 
subject matter of the contract or of some condition 
or particular state of things which is of the sub-
stance of the contract, it is attributal to some 
breach of contract or of duty on the part of one 
party and prevents the other party from performing 
his contract, such other party has a right of action 
on the contract notwithstanding such non-performance." 
Therefore, the failure to deliver clear title, which would 
allow the appellant to obtain a loan to pay off the appellee con-
stitutes a breach on the part of the appellee which prevented 
the appellant from performing, and appellant's non-performance 
does not prevent him from maintaining the action for strict per-
formance as prayed for in the complaint. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT A JURY 
TRIAL. 
-7-
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This case involves a consolidation of two actions. The 
first action was commenced by the appellant to compel specifii 
performance of an oral contract for the purchase of land. Ap 
pellee filed a civil action seeking to evict the appellant e 1 
for unlawful detainer. As stated in the Statement of Facts,· 
two actions were consolidated upon motion of the appellee and 
stipulation of the appellant and a jury trial was requested (: 
12-13, Sup. Ct. #16666). The jury fee was paid and then the 
appellee objected to the jury trial (Tr. 44). The court stati 
"We have had a discussion in chambers not on the 
record. Mr. Leedy has made a motion that there be 
a jury trial. He also, in Civil No. 78-3718, a 
long time ago and timely, made a demand for jury 
-- trial. Mr. Eckersley made a demand to strike the 
jury, claiming Mr. Coleman does not have his right 
on the claim, that it is a contract and it is taken 
out from under the statute of frauds by the doc-
trine of part performance and that that is an e-
quitable matter and therefore, he is not entitled 
to a jury trial. Counsel discussed the matter 
with me in chambers and it is my opinion that on 
those issues, it is an equitable matter and am deny-
ing the jury trial and the matter will proceed to 
court ..... 
In effect, these cases won't be consolidated. 
We're going to try Mr. Coleman's case first, but 
that will be non-jury." (Tr. 3-4) 
It is the appellant's position that once the cases were 
consolidated and the jury demand made, that the court erred ir 
separating the two cases and trying some of the issues withou'. 
a jury although no request for separation was made. C.F. Will< 
M. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cox, 580 P. 2d 607 (Utah 1978). 
It is unique in this case that there has never been a fine 
that there was not an oral contract for the purchase or salec 
the land in question. Obviously, such a finding would be a fi 
tual issues for the jury. 
-8-
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NOT PART PER-
FOR.1'1ANCE. 
There is no question that specific performance is a proper 
remedy for a breach of an oral contract for the purchase of 
land. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 1976); Sandberg 
v. Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978); Summary of Utah Real 
Property Law, Ch. VIII, p. 259; Christensen v. Christensen, 9 
UT 2d 102, 105, 339 P. 2d 101, 103 (1959); Brinton v. Vancott, 
8 Utah 480, 33 Pac. 218 (1893); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 
40, 269 P. 2d 278 (1954); Lynch v. Coriglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 Pac. 
983 (1898); In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P. 2d 595 
(1953); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 
P. 2d 480 (1956); Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. Herschel Gold Min. 
_ Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 P. 2d 1094 (1943); Adams v. Taylor, 391 
P. 2d 837 (Utah 1964); 9 Utah Law Rev. 91, 100-101; Brady v. 
Fausett, 546 P. 2d 246 (Utah 1976); Utah Code Ann., 25-5-8, 1953. 
Section 25-5-8, Utah Code Ann. provides: 
"Nothing in this chapter contained should be con-
strued to abridge the powers of the courts to compel 
the specific performance of agreements in case of 
part performance thereof." 
There is no question that the appellant moved into possession 
of the premises; that he made payments thereon; that he made re-
pairs thereon, and improvement thereon. If there was a contract 
for the purchase of land, these facts would certainly show part 
performance. The issue is not whether there was substantial per-
formance but whether or not a contract for the purchase of the 
-9-
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property in question existed the court erred in finding that 
the above facts do not constitute part performance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard J. Leedy 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ~~day of July, 1980, 
I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Ap?ellant to 
M. David Eckersley, 500 Ten West Broadway Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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